Those who hold that democracy is the real hope for the Middle East must seek ways to become full partners in defining the goals and means of a campaign to free Iraq, and to ensure that the way we deal with Iraq promotes democracy elsewhere in the region.
For a U.S.-led campaign to gain support both inside Iraq and in the wider world, its objectives must go beyond "regime change." The goals must also go beyond eliminating the Iraqi government's capacities to use or acquire weapons of mass destruction. There must be great clarity about the democratic character of the regime we will help to establish. We must also be clear about our determination to provide security to the people of Iraq, not simply to our allies and ourselves. We must demonstrate that we are prepared to stay the course and meet the costs.
As America awoke to the threats posed by terrorists and aggressive tyrants in the Middle East, the Bush Administration turned from the "more humble" foreign policy it promised in campaign debates to a posture of go-it-alone swaggering. Regrettably, critics and opponents here and abroad were then able to portray the U.S. role in the Middle East as one grounded only in selfish economic purposes (oil), our own narrow security interests, or our hostility to foreign cultures or religions.
At the same time, the Administration's conduct at home has been polarizing our politics, when national unity is needed for a difficult and dangerous foreign campaign. Many in labor and among its allies in the Democratic Party are reluctant to rally to the President's call for confrontation in Iraq.
White House wedge politicians should take notice: they would be foolish to underestimate the political challenges that lie ahead. A host of groups, not all of them provocative or ineffectual, is groping for ways to turn the skepticism that is widespread in our communities into outright opposition. It is possible that the first phase of a military campaign will be short, and that casualties will be few. But the perils of war are too often underestimated, and there are signs that some Bush advisers may be unduly self-confident, especially when it comes to security problems that may persist after the present Iraqi leadership has been dealt with.
Nevertheless, we strongly support the determined measures, including the use of U.S. military force, that will almost certainly be required to deal with Saddam Hussein.
Yet there is no need to assent passively to a military campaign based on short-term security concerns and poorly conceived political strategy, or to an Administration that is uncertain in its commitments to the potentially huge task of assuring a democratic outcome in Iraq. While some in the Bush Administration have shown admirable willingness to make the Middle East the next theatre of democratic transformation, others are hesitant and equivocal. Those pressing the cause of democracy deserve energetic support.
It is the challenge of democracy in the Middle East that gives Saddam Hussein such special significance. If this reckless, brutal and aggressive dictator acquires weapons that enable him to extend his power over the oil-rich, volatile, populous, democratically underdeveloped and strategically critical Middle East, the promise of democracy can be arrested, and even turned back. Economic development will slow, desperation and anger will fuel further turmoil and terrorism, and the security and quality of life even in established democracies will be curtailed. (It is its strategic importance to the region, the world, and the future of the democratic movement that distinguishes the challenge of Iraq from the challenge of North Korea.)
Because it did not build the pro-democracy case effectively, and seemed to disdain the effort to find allies, the Administration set itself up last summer for ambush on the terrain of international diplomacy. We failed to state our position in terms that engaged the moral values and practical interests of others, and became vulnerable to the charge that we are oil-greedy, highhanded "unilateralists." (Many in this Administration still do not comprehend the deep, direct and demonstrated link between the national security interests of the United States and the emergence of democracy on ground held by our opponents.)
It is, of course, imperative to prevent Saddam from threatening his neighbors and the world with weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons will surely be used to challenge the U.S. commitment to the security of the one democracy that now exists in the Middle East – Israel. Moreover, as targets of terror, the United States has the right and obligation to prevent future attacks that could make that on the World Trade Center seem small by comparison. The terrorists' announced aspiration to outdo themselves will lead them to seek out cooperative governments, and the government most likely to collaborate with them is that of Saddam Hussein.
But it is also urgent that we now turn attention once again to the unceasing savagery Saddam Hussein employs against the peoples of Iraq, and the fear and uncertainty he engenders among his neighbors and in the international economy. The dossier of atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein has persuaded Human Rights Watch and others to call for an international criminal tribunal to try him and other top Iraqi leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity. But, as is so often is the case, while human rights advocates speak eloquently about crimes, they often demur from realistic means for dealing with these criminals or protecting their victims.
A decision to go to war should never be taken lightly. Military action against Saddam Hussein is justified when it combines four purposes. First, it must rid the region and the world of the threat he poses, especially if he is armed with weapons of mass destruction. It must both liberate the people of Iraq and lay the foundation for democracy in Iraq. Fourth, this costly and dangerous enterprise must be built upon to advance the cause of peace and democracy throughout the region.
Every effort should be made to enlist the United Nations and other governments in this undertaking. But if that does not prove possible, the U.S. may still be justified in acting with an ad hoc group of allies, or even alone. The United Nations, a body still deeply compromised by the veto power and influence of governments that are no friends to democracy, cannot be the ultimate arbiter of democracy's morality or interests.
As former Vice-President Gore acknowledged in his speech in San Francisco, "it is abundantly clear that the existing U.N. resolutions passed 11 years ago are completely sufficient from a legal standpoint" for taking military action against Saddam Hussein. Nor would action by the U.S. alone set any dire precedent. Some contend that the recent paper by the Bush Administration setting out its justification for preventive war in a time of terrorism can be used to justify any global adventurism. Those who actually read this paper, "The National Security Strategy for the United States" may be surprised to find that it actually sets forward careful descriptions of the kind of regime and the circumstances that warrant such action. Its terms are rigorous, and respect the bounds of international law. The case it makes on the impossibility of waging merely defensive resistance against suicidally aggressive opponents who target civilians is a compelling one.
But many in the Bush Administration, who in the past have sneered at "nation-building" or "making the U.S. the world's 911 number," may not themselves accept the demanding recommendations this paper makes for contending with rogue states and extending democracy. (Many Republicans, it may be recalled, sought to prevent the Clinton Administration from using American military power to deal with the criminal Milosevic regime.)
No government should be permitted to hide behind sovereignty to commit crimes against humanity. This principle was adopted by human rights activists seeking action against the perpetrators of genocidal violence in the Balkans and Africa during the 1990s. It springs from the same logic that justified armed intervention by the Federal government against those invoking "states rights" to defend slavery and Jim Crow in the American South. This moral logic should guide us in dealing with Saddam Hussein.
The world indeed is engaged in a clash of civilizations. But this is not at its heart a clash between Islam and the West; it is a clash between democracy and a new array of violent and totalitarian forces. As in the struggle against communism, we must press our own government and others firmly to respect civil rights, civil liberties and religious freedoms, at home and elsewhere. The difficulties we confront in the Middle East have been greatly compounded because we too readily traded away concerns about human rights and democracy out of fleeting economic and security interests.
Some on the right will exploit the patriotism and anxiety of this moment for domestic political purposes. Their hope is to replay the politics of the Vietnam era and the late Cold War, reviving divisions among Democrats and allied groups, and rallying supporters of strong defense and foreign policies to the Republican camp. Some on the left have eagerly joined this familiar charade – even though trade unions, women, independent religious groups, homosexuals, intellectuals and artists are among Saddam Hussein's most sought after victims.
Yes, first the United States must seek out all the friends and allies it can get. But then it must cut the Gordian knot of extremism and violence that entangles the Middle East by deposing Saddam Hussein and bringing to birth democracy in Iraq.
This is too important a challenge to leave to the Bush Administration alone.
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